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Abstract
Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) has been generally regarded as an ideal network
model for group communications. However, the security deployment for MANET rout-
ing operations is problematic. Firstly, existing secured routing protocols are deficient
in achieving both authentication efficiency and full scale of security. In addition, the
diversity of routing protocols presents difficulties in the generalisation of the security
design. The most possible candidate solution,the digital signature, has far from been
properly implemented from an ad hoc point of view.
In this thesis, we are motivated to provide necessary security features to MANET
routing operations in an efficient manner. Considering the feasibility of utilising digital
signatures in MANET, we incorporate the notion of the online/offline signature scheme
in our design, where the computational overhead is shifted to the offline phase. We also
make use of the one-time signature scheme, which is efficient in computation, and the
multisignature scheme, which is especially suitable for group authentication. Then,
we observe the specialities of different routing protocols (AODV-ad hoc on-demand
distance vector routing and DSR-dynamic source routing), as well as the similarities
between above signature schemes.
In our design, we exploit the efficiency and the adaptability of signature schemes.
As our contributions, we propose two authentication schemes to secure AODV and
DSR protocol respectively. For AODV protocol, our ID-based online/offline signature
schemes enhance the authentication performance by properly balancing the computa-
tional overhead, whereas the one-time signature scheme achieves the same objective by
making trade-offs between computation power and memory storage. For DSR proto-
col, we provide a generic construction from ID-based online/offline signature schemes
to ID-based multisignature schemes, so that the installation over AODV can be trans-
formed to offer the same level of security for DSR. Our scheme is unique, in the sense
that a single ID-based online/offline signature scheme can be applied to both AODV
and DSR routing protocols.
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